Exhibit 35

Excerpt of
Opposition to Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and
Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

June 29, 1998 Hearing: 10:00 A.M. Time: Before the Honorable Dickran Tevrizian

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impermissible new rule of law in violation of <u>Teague v. Lane</u>, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

D. <u>Claim 4. Failure To Disclose Material Evidence</u> (Samuelson)

In petitioner's fourth claim for relief (pet. at 31-44), he alleges that the prosecution failed to disclose fully the benefits given to witness Bruce Samuelson in exchange for his testimony, thereby denying petitioner his rights in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular, petitioner alleges that witness Bruce Samuelson falsely testified as to the scope and nature of the benefits he received from the prosecution in exchange for his testimony, and that the prosecution failed to correct this false testimony at the time it was made.

In support of this legal claim, petitioner specifically alleges that Bruce Samuelson was asked during his trial testimony what "in exchange for agreeing to testify" he had "been offered . . . from the San Joaquin County District Attorney's office."

(Pet. at 35:19-20, 36:1-2.) In response, Samuelson testified that the district attorney's office had stated that it "would recommend a one-year county jail sentence with a felony conviction" as opposed to "[g]oing to state prison." (Pet. at 36:3-7.) Petitioner further alleges that, on cross-examination, Samuelson agreed with defense counsel that he had been "given a promise by the prosecution" for "a recommendation" of a sentence of "a year in the county jail." (Pet. at 36:9-15.)

In support of the allegation that this was false testimony, which should have been disclosed to him, petitioner alleges that "contrary to Samuelson's sworn testimony which went uncorrected by the District Attorney, there was an agreement between the District Attorney and Samuelson . . . which later was verified in court on the record at a December 14, 1982 municipal court hearing . . . that four felony charges pending against Samuelson would be dismissed in exchange for his testimony against petitioner and that Samuelson's sentence would be one year and it would be served locally at the county jail." (Pet. at 38:13 - 39:1 emphasis original.)

The warden has both admitted and affirmatively alleged in his answer to this claim the following facts: The warden has admitted that at the time of petitioner's trial, Bruce Samuelson was a prosecution witness against petitioner and that in exchange for his testimony against petitioner, the San Joaquin County District Attorney's Office negotiated a plea agreement with Mr. Samuelson. The warden further has admitted that the terms of the plea agreement were put on the record in open court in Mr. Samuelson's case in Municipal Court for the Stockton Judicial District in San Joaquin County on or about December 14, 1982. The warden further has admitted that pursuant to that on the record agreement, the district attorney agreed to dismiss 4 of 6 pending felony charges and to would recommend that Samuelson receive felony probation and jail time of no more than one year. The warden further has admitted that at the time of Samuelson's testimony at petitioner's trial on or about March 29, 1983, he

testified that the district attorney's office had stated that in exchange for his testimony against petitioner it "would recommend a one-year county jail sentence with a felony conviction" as opposed to "[g]oing to state prison." The warden further has admitted that on cross-examination, Samuelson agreed with defense counsel that he had been "given a promise by the prosecution" for "a recommendation" of a sentence of "a year in the county jail," and that his case had been put over until April 11, 1983, for a probation violation order to show cause and "for a pre-trial Except as admitted above, the warden has conference." specifically and generally denied all other additional allegations in claim 4.

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The warden also has affirmatively alleged in response to claim 4 that as part of the plea agreement placed on the record in Municipal Court in Samuelson's case on December 14, 1982, the terms of the plea agreement were not guaranteed to Samuelson. In particular, the warden has affirmatively alleged that Mr. Samuelson was specifically advised by the judge at that hearing as to the non-binding nature of the agreement under California law as follows: "[i]f the Superior Court Judge in Superior Court decides after reading the probation report that he doesn't wish to give you a year in county jail, but wanted to send you to state prison or to give you some harsher treatment than that, you would have a right to [withdraw your plea and] return here to this court."

The warden further has affirmatively alleged that these on-the-record admonitions to Mr. Samuelson correctly articulate

the rule of law in California that the prosecution has no power to guarantee any criminal defendant any particular disposition of criminal charges as part of a plea agreement because the all plea dispositions must be approved by a judge before they can be carried out and that the judge has the power to reject the plea agreement should the judge find the terms of the agreement inappropriate.

One simple answer to petitioner's claim is that it is legally and factually false. Under California law, a prosecutor is without the power to bind the trial judge to any negotiated disposition. The trial judge retains the discretion to reject any negotiated plea agreement made by the prosecution anytime the judge finds the proposed sentence is too lenient. Thus, the prosecutor could not as a matter of law have guaranteed Samuelson a one year county jail sentence, given the possibility that the sentencing judge could reject it as too lenient.

This undisputable fact of California law is supported by the very evidence that petitioner relies upon to advance his claim that Samuelson's proposed one-year county jail sentence was guaranteed. As noted in the municipal court transcript attached as Exhibit F to the amended petition and affirmatively alleged as true in the answer, the municipal court judge in Samuelson's car theft and forgery case specifically advised him that his negotiated plea was not guaranteed: "[i]f the Superior Court Judge in Superior Court decides after reading the probation report that he doesn't wish to give you a year in county jail, but wanted to send you to state prison or to give you some

harsher treatment than that, you would have a right to [withdraw your plea and] return here to this court. . . " (See Pet. at 245-49, 246:27 - 247:3.)

Apart from this simple and dispositive defect in petitioner's claim, petitioner cannot obtain relief on this claim for the equally simple reason that he cannot meet the legal standard needed to obtain relief. Even if petitioner's allegations were assumed true for the sake of argument only, they fail to meet the test of materiality that defines the constitutional duty of prosecutors to turn over to the defense exculpatory or impeachment evidence.

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state prosecutor has a duty "to assist the defense in making its case," by producing to the defense before and during trial both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6, and 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, (1976). This does not mean, however, that prosecutors have a "'duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they learn about the case and about their witnesses'" that "might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-110, id. at 112 n.20.

Instead, if a prosecutor is in possession of evidence that is "highly probative of innocence," he "is presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it" and is under a constitutional duty to turn it over to the defense. <u>Id.</u>

at 110. The duty therefore exists only "if the omitted evidence created reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, [and] constitutional error has been committed." Id. at 112.

When the absence of the undisclosed evidence from the trial creates reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, the failure to disclose "'undermine[s] confidence in the outcome of the trial,'" Kyles v. Whitley, 511 U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506 (1995) and requires a new trial. On the other hand, "[i]f there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-113.

Assuming but not conceding the truth of petitioner's allegations, petitioner's claim is that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense that he had actually guaranteed, not just promised to "recommend," that Samuelson would not be sent to state prison, as opposed to county jail, in exchange for his testimony. Thus, in petitioner's view, the undisclosed distinction between a guaranteed county jail sentence and a recommended county jail sentence prison could reasonably be taken to put the whole case is such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict and create reasonable doubt as to the jury's finding of guilt that did not otherwise exist.

The warden disagrees. On this record, any alleged undisclosed distinction between a guaranteed county jail sentence and a recommended county jail sentence for Samuelson's testimony cannot is neither "highly probative of innocence," <u>United States</u>

<u>v. Agurs</u>, 427 U.S. at 110, nor does it "create[] reasonable doubt that d[oes] not otherwise exist," <u>id.</u> at 112, with respect to the jury's finding of guilt. In other words, the allegation does nothing to "'undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. at 1565.

A close examination of Samuelson's actual testimony reveals that defense counsel focused his entire cross-examination of Samuelson on laying the evidentiary foundation for his eventual argument to the jury that Samuelson was a savvy jailhouse lawyer who had fabricated his testimony, based on talk going around in the jail and his own special knowledge of criminal law, in an effort to curry favor with the prosecution and to avoid going to state prison for up to 13 years in his own pending criminal cases. Given the evidence presented and the arguments based thereon, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the alleged "guaranteed" county jail sentence would have made one bit of difference in the jury's finding of guilt.

Bruce Samuelson testified at petitioner's trial on March 29, 1983. (RT 2271.) At the time of trial, Samuelson testified that he was 22 years old and first met petitioner in April 1982 in the maximum security section of the San Joaquin County Jail. At the time of this meeting, Samuelson was serving a one-year sentence for two second-degree felony burglary convictions. (RT 2331.)

Samuelson had certain jail privileges at the time that allowed him to deliver to petitioner in the maximum security section pens and envelops from another inmate. Samuelson made

two such deliveries to petitioner before he was transferred out of county jail to an honor farm. Samuelson was released from the jail on June 2, 1982. (RT 2332.)

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On November 3, 1982, Samuelson was arrested in Arizona for a California charge of possession of a stolen vehicle. Samuelson was returned to Stockton, California, and charged with one count of vehicle theft, two counts of receiving stolen property, and three counts of forgery. At the time of Samuelson's testimony on March 29, 1983, he testified that all but one of the six charges were still pending against him. He further testified that while one of the forgery charges was no longer pending against him, he had been in custody continuously since he was arrested on November 3, 1982 until the time of his testimony on March 29, 1983, and that his next court date on the charges was set for April 11, 1983. (RT 2332-33, 2373.)

Samuelson further testified that in exchange for agreeing to testify against petitioner, Samuelson had been offered by the district attorney's office a one-year county jail sentence sentence state prison to a recommendation, opposed (RT 2341-42, 2371.) Samuelson further testified recommendation. that, with good time work time credits, he expected to actually serve only six months in county jail. (RT 2372.) He also testified that he was also on probation for his two prior burglary convictions, and had been told and expected that his then-pending and unresolved probation violation on convictions would either be dismissed or go on record as a violation without him being sentenced to state prison.

2372.) Samuelson testified that he previously had waived five months county jail time on his burglary convictions in order to avoid going to state prison for three years, but that he still "doubt[ed] it very seriously" that he would be sentenced to state prison on the unresolved probation violation. (RT 2346-48, 2372.) Samuelson further testified that he had been in custody outside San Joaquin County ever since he came forward, and that he did not expect to serve as a sentence on his pending charges any further county jail time in San Joaquin County. (RT 2372-73.)

On November 10, 1982, Samuelson was returned to Stockton, California, and placed in protective custody in the maximum security section in cell-block eight. Samuelson was first placed in cell 14 and then, because of a "nonuseable" sink and toilet, Samuelson was placed three hours later in cell 12, across from petitioner's cell, cell 10, at an angle. The distance between petitioner and Samuelson was about four and a half feet. The cells are staggered at 30 to 45 degree angles across from one another. (RT 2333-34, 2342.)

Samuelson and petitioner greeted each other, and on or about November 11th after Samuelson had returned from court, Samuelson and petitioner began "to discuss some technicalities about [petitioner's] case." Samuelson was acting as his own attorney at the time and discussed with petitioner possible "actions on behalf of the defense [in petitioner's case] to exclude certain witnesses." (RT 2335.)

Beginning around the 15th of November 1982, and continuing for approximately two weeks thereafter, petitioner told Samuelson about how he killed Terri Winchell. (RT 2340.) Samuelson testified that petitioner told him that he received a telephone call from his cousin, who was going to meet with the victim. Petitioner further stated that approximately a half hour later, he received another telephone call his cousin, this time from the Weberstown Mall area, who had picked up the girl and was en route to the house. (RT 2336.)

Upon arrival at the house, one of the females at the house was asked to go purchase some liquor or something else at the store, and petitioner had prepared to go out with a small thin belt he was wearing, a kitchen knife, and a hammer. They then left in the car via city streets through town northbound towards Lodi until they reached the outskirts of town outside of hearing distance from anyone else. Petitioner told Samuelson that they drove out that distance to avoid detection. (RT 2336-37.)

As they were driving, petitioner attempted to strangle the victim with his belt, but it broke. As petitioner first attempted to strangle her, she tried to grab it and pull it away. She was making noises, screaming for help, and eventually fell

^{12.} Petitioner's defense counsel moved to exclude Samuelson's testimony concerning petitioner's admissions on the grounds that the statements were hearsay, and that Samuelson, because he was a witness in custody testifying "for leniency or favors," he was incompetent to testify without a preliminary finding of fact concerning his credibility. The trial court overruled both objections, stating that the statements were admissible under California Evidence Code section 1220, subject to cross-examination by defense counsel concerning Samuelson's credibility. (RT 2335:18 - 2336:8.)

forward and passed out unconscious. Petitioner grabbed her hair and pulled her back and started beating the back of her head with a hammer. Petitioner could not remember how many times he hit her with the hammer, but it was several blows, severe blows to the back of her head. (RT 2337-38.)

After about 15 minutes went by from the time they had left town until the last blow to the head, petitioner told his cousin to pull over and stop the car. Petitioner then took her body out of the car and dragged her by her feet face down across the pavement and into a field. Petitioner then thought to himself that there was "no use wasting a good piece of ass" so he decided to "bone it." Petitioner then raped the victim. (RT 2338.)

Since petitioner's intent "to begin with" was to kill the victim, petitioner "wanted to make sure" she was dead, so he then stabbed her four times. Petitioner didn't really know if she was alive at that point. He then got up, started to walk away, but then turned around and called her a "fucking bitch." (RT 2338-39.)

During this time, petitioner's cousin had been driving around keeping watch for any persons in the area. Petitioner then met his cousin at the car and threw the weapons and the belt into the trunk of the car. They returned to the house where there were two girls, Raquel and Pat. Petitioner dumped the purse on the table, (RT 2339-40), and went to hide the belt, and to wash the hammer, knife, and car. They first cleaned the weapons, then they went outside and used a hose and some rags.

(RT 2339.) One of the girls went outside with petitioner and questioned him why he was using the hose. (RT 2339-40.)

Petitioner put one of the weapons, the knife, in the refrigerator. He also took eleven dollars from the purse and used it to buy two packs of cigarettes, a six-pack of beer, and some wine. (RT 2340.)

While in custody, petitioner and Samuelson discussed a book called "Prescription Murder" that involved a case in Texas where a doctor had killed his first wife by injecting his wife with a cultured mixture containing feces that went undetected, and attempted to kill his second wife with an injection of procaine hydrochloride. Petitioner asked Samuelson if there was any way Samuelson could get released "OR" or on bail and assume the same situation with one of the girls, particularly Raquel. Petitioner told Samuelson that he would probably find Raquel living with her parents and younger sibling in Woodbridge, and that if she wasn't there, she had relatives strung out from Stockton or Woodbridge to Los Angeles. Petitioner told Samuelson that he did not know where Pat was living but that Samuelson was probably smart enough to find out for himself. (RT 2340-41.)

On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited admissions from Samuelson that he was living in the Stockton area in the early part of 1981, and that by March of that year, he was in custody on a petty theft charge at the same time petitioner and Rick Ortega were in custody and having their preliminary hearing. Samuelson admitted that there was talk in the jail about Morales and Ortega being held for on murder charges, but denied being

privy to any of those conversations or having any curiosity about the case. In Samuelson's words: "I don't like to become familiar with too many cases other than my own." (RT 2343-45, 2345:11-12.)

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Defense counsel further elicited admissions from Samuelson that, after his release on the 18th of April, he was back in custody on the 28th of May on four counts of burglary. then elicited an admission from Samuelson that the district attorney's office had sought a three year state prison sentence, until Samuelson's Youth Authority parole officer recommended that he be recommitted to the Youth Authority. Samuelson then admitted that he was rejected by the Youth Authority as unamenable before the trial judge gave him another "break" by sentencing him to a year in county jail contingent on Samuelson waiving all of the five months he had already served in county Samuelson admitted that pursuant to that plea agreement, he waived all credit for time served in custody prior to October 1, 1981, and served time in county jail from that date to June 2, 1982, and then was released on probation on certain terms and (RT 2345-49.) conditions.

Defense counsel then got Samuelson to admit that after he was arrested and put back into custody in November 1982 on the car theft and forgery charges, he was also charged with a probation violation on his burglary convictions that was still pending. Defense counsel then got Samuelson to admit that on both the new charges and the probation violation, he was facing as much as 13 years in state prison. (RT 2349-52.) Defense counsel

then asked Samuelson if the circumstances of his two case suggested to him that he was "certainly headed for prison," but Samuelson would only concede that he "was not sure" he was headed for prison and that he thought he still had a 50/50 chance of beating the charges against him acting as his own attorney with a court-appointed advisor. (RT 2352-53.)

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Defense counsel then elicited admissions from Samuelson that he had seen in petitioner's cell piles of police reports and transcripts, and Morales had made mention of them. further admitted to defense counsel that he had been shown some of petitioner's reports and had actually held and read "a couple of sentences" in either a criminalist's report from petitioner's the criminalist's preliminary hearing testimony case, concerning semen and blood typing. Defense counsel also got Samuelson to concede that he had read a page in petitioner's preliminary hearing transcript concerning someone seeing something in the house and someone else saying it was not there. (RT 2353-58.)

Samuelson further admitted to defense counsel that at some time while he was in county jail he had "free roam" of the jail that was not afforded to others because he was a trustee. (RT 2355.) Defense counsel further got Samuelson to admit that he had seen Greg Winchell in custody with him and had heard "rumors" that Greg Winchell was Terri Winchell's brother. (RT 2362.)

Defense counsel then extracted from Samuelson admissions that he had been in protective custody from July 1981 until his release to the honor farm more than four months later, and that

the reason he was placed there was that other inmates thought he was "a snitch" or a "cop" and that he was there to elicit information from people and then to give it to the prosecution. Defense counsel also drew from Samuelson an admission that he was placed in protective custody to insure his physical well-being from other inmates, and that he now had what was called "a snitch jacket." Samuelson admitted that he was immediately placed back into protective custody upon his return to jail in November 1982. In making these admissions, Samuelson gratuitously explained that certain inmates in the jail knew he was taking college courses as an administration of justice major, and had erroneously assumed he was a cop. (RT 2364-66.)

Defense counsel then got Samuelson to concede that he faced the possibility of going to prison with a snitch jacket, and that in prison he would be placed in protective custody segregated from everyone else. Samuelson acknowledged to defense counsel that he was "interested in trying to avoid going to prison," and that, to that end, he wrote a letter to the prosecutor advising him that he could guarantee him a murder and special circumstances conviction in petitioner's case. (RT 2366-68.)

Defense counsel then got Samuelson to admit that, in the letter, he had stated if the information in Morales' case was not enough to persuade the prosecution to make a deal, he also put in the letter to the prosecutor that he also had information on another death penalty case against James Mahoney, information on "many" drug sales in North Stockton, and some of the biggest

dealers in town. Defense counsel evoked from Samuelson an admission that he "was pulling out all stops and offering just about any sort of information" he could. (RT 2368-70.) Defense counsel then concluded his cross-examination by going over the prosecution's promise of recommendation of a year in county jail, and the likelihood that Samuelson would have little time left to serve if that were his sentence on both his theft and forgery charges and his probation violation. Counsel then implied through questioning, and Samuelson did not testify otherwise, that Samuelson's cases had been put over until April 11, 1983 "[t]o see how you do here." (RT 2370-73.) The prosecutor declined to conduct any redirect questioning of Samuelson. (RT 2374.)

All of this laid the evidentiary groundwork for defense counsel's eventual argument to the jury in closing that Samuelson's testimony was not worthy of belief. One of defense counsel's major themes to the jury was that "nobody puts him [Morales] in the car. Nobody sees him in the car at the time that Terri was -- was killed. In fact nobody ever saw him get into the car from the testimony that you've heard from the stand, . . . obviously Samuelson, because he's usually in jail." (RT 2608-09.)

Defense counsel's argument to the jury thus focused on the fact that "the testimony about what happened in the car is coming in by way of what we call, in legal terms, an admission." (RT 2609.) Counsel emphasized to the jury that admissions, by definition, did not themselves acknowledge guilt, but only tended

to prove guilt when considered with the other evidence, and that it was entirely up to the jury to decide if petitioner made admissions. In so doing, counsel stressed that California law required the jurors to view petitioner's oral statements with caution and skepticism because of the possibility of misapprehension, faulty recall, and misrepresentation. (RT 2609-10.)

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Defense counsel also emphasized to the jury that the instructions concerning how the jury was to evaluate witness credibility, twice singling out the fact that the credibility instruction allowed the jury to consider Samuelson's two prior felony convictions. (RT 2611-12.)

Defense counsel then focused on Samuelson's demeanor, describing Samuelson as "the essence of a what you might call a con man" (RT 2612:12-13), "very . . . streetwise, very articulate," who had appeared to attempt to "ingratiate himself with you [the jury] or the prosecution by throwing in little things like how he's working in police administration . . . " (RT 2612:14-18), which counsel urged, reflected nothing more than the fact that Samuelson was "attempting to educate himself in terms of perhaps being a little more sophisticated [and] . . . keeping (RT 2612:25-26.) Defense counsel summed up out of trouble." Samuelson's testimony and "the way he talked" about certain things as giving the "impression that he knows his way around the courts and is a pretty manipulative sort of person." (RT 2613:1-3.)

Defense counsel then went straight into an attack on Samuelson's testimony that he was not predisposed to following anyone's criminal case but his own. Counsel quoted to the jury Samuelson's testimony that "I don't like to become too familiar with too many cases other than my own" and impeached it with Samuelson's written statements to the prosecutor, revealing that "he was terribly interested in a number of cases, Mr. Morales' case, another death penalty case, cases involving drug sales in north Stockton involving several dealers." (RT 2613:9-14.) directly called into "question his [Samuelson's] statements about not being too familiar and not hearing things in jail about the case prior to testifying." (RT 2613:15-17.) Counsel stressed that "news about what goes on at the jail and about people at the jail certainly gets around a lot more than Mr. Samuelson would lead us to believe" given that Samuelson himself testified that a "rumor had been spread throughout the jail" about Samuelson so that "he needed to be put in protective custody." (RT 2613.)

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Defense counsel also sought to depict Samuelson as desperately using this case to avoid going to prison for 13 years. Counsel began by directly challenging Samuelson's testimony that he thought he had a 50/50 chance of beating the charges against him: "And yet if he had that good a chance of beating the charges, I wonder why he is in such desperation indicated he could testify in three or four more different cases." (RT 2614:1-3.) Counsel explained: "It's obvious, I

think, he has a bias, an interest and a motive. He said he was looking -- the most he could get was 13 years." (RT 2614:8-10.)

Counsel explained to the jury that despite Samuelson's testimony to the effect that he might not go to prison, the fact that Samuelson had a prior record where he "almost" went to prison and had to waive five months time in custody in order to do so, and then was picked up again after only five months out of custody, "indicates he was in pretty hot water and that he certainly didn't want to go to prison. And he didn't want to go to prison with a snitch jacket." (RT 2614:11-19.)

Defense counsel thus summed up Samuelson's interest and bias by asking the jury to take an objective look at what Samuelson was facing:

"So I think in terms of how much of an interest he has in coming through for the prosecution can be determined by what he was facing, which was certainly not only a lot of time, but under the circumstances of him being an informant or a snitch or whatever you want to call him, the time he was doing was going to be time that I don't think he was looking forward to." (RT 2614:20-26.)

Defense counsel then sought to portray Samuelson's testimony as fabricated and specifically tailored by Samuelson to support a torture murder special circumstance allegation. Counsel began by seizing upon the prosecutor's characterization of Samuelson as a "jailhouse lawyer" during the prosecutor's

opening argument. Counsel stated to the jury: "I think Mr. Garber's assessment of him as a jailhouse lawyer is pretty good."

(RT 2615:4-5.) Counsel explained this agreement by stating that some of Samuelson's testimony presented a "pretty good case for torture," and was so good that it appeared "tailored" to prove "torture and special circumstances." (RT 2615:2-13.)

As counsel emphasized to the jury that Samuelson had put in his letter to the prosecutor that he "could guarantee a first degree murder conviction with special circumstances" and asked the jury to think about why Samuelson put that in the letter. Counsel then suggested to the jury that "maybe being a jailhouse lawyer, he's looked up a little bit of the law in the jail and knows what some of the elements are of first degree murder and special circumstances?" (RT 2615:15-18.)

Counsel then suggested that proof that Samuelson's testimony was fabricated as a result of research Samuelson must have done could be found in the fact that his testimony was contradicted by the physical evidence of the murder itself. Counsel pointed out to the jury that Samuelson had testified that petitioner had rendered Terri Winchell unconscious before he started hitting her with the hammer. Counsel explained: ". . . if that were true, then that sort of does look like torture. If

^{13.} During the prosecutor's opening argument, he urged the jury to believe that petitioner had actually approached Samuelson based on evidence that Samuelson was "sort of a jailhouse lawyer," and "before you know it, Mike Morales is telling Bruce Samuelson about his case. And I submit this is

pretty logical and understandable." (RT 2560:6, 2560:14-17.)

a person is unconscious, what's the purpose of hitting him?" (RT 2615:26-28.)

Counsel then sought to convince the jury that the testimony was not true because it conflicted with the testimony of other witnesses and the physical evidence of the murder. Counsel pointed out that Samuelson's testimony that petitioner had strangled Terri Winchell for about a minute to minute and a half until she was unconscious was contradicted by the pathologist's testimony that "he saw nothing wrong with the neck, no bruising, no lacerations." (RT 2616:1-12.)

After counsel attacked the credibility of petitioner's girlfriend and roommate as to additional admissions made by petitioner, counsel asserted to the jury that their collective accounts reflected "three different versions here" that did not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (RT 2630:3-11.) Counsel then returned to his argument that Samuelson's "little story" was tailored to meet "a torture sort of theory," which Samuelson must have "learned from his law books or his administration of justice courses." (RT 2630:12-17.) He concluded his remarks as to Samuelson by pointing out that Samuelson may have gotten the law right, but he got the facts wrong when he testified that the knife was put in the refrigerator and the evidence showed that it was the hammer that was discovered in the refrigerator. (RT 2630:18-25.)

Any alleged undisclosed distinction between a guaranteed county jail sentence and a recommended county jail sentence for Bruce Samuelson cannot, on the above-described record, create

reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist with respect to the jury's finding of guilt. It is clear that the defense had been sufficiently aware of numerous details concerning made Samuelson's background so as to allow the defense to conduct a detailed cross-examination and to arque that Samuelson's unresolved charges and probation violation gave him an incentive to fabricate and color his testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution so as to increase the likelihood of him receiving the recommended county jail sentence at the time of his sentencing.

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Given this record, if the jury knew that the proposed jail sentence was somehow guaranteed by the prosecution, such a disclosure would have done little to strengthen the attack actually mounted against Samuelson's credibility. Indeed, it was the fact that the proposed sentence was not guaranteed that formed the evidentiary basis of the defense claim that Samuelson was lying in an attempt to gain favor for himself at his thenburglary probation violation hearing and auto upcoming theft/forgery pretrial conference. Ιf the sentence was guaranteed, then the defense would have been without evidentiary basis to argue Samuelson had testified falsely in hopes of currying favor with the prosecutor and the sentencing judge, because the guaranteed sentence would not have been in any way contingent on currying favor with anyone.

On this record, and giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt, the most one can say about any alleged undisclosed distinction between a recommended county jail sentence and a

guaranteed county jail sentence is that such a revelation "might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-110, id. at 112 n.20. Such evidence, however, is not material within the meaning of the Constitution. It cannot be said that the alleged undisclosed evidence made the prosecution's "case much stronger, and the defense case much weaker, than the full facts would have suggested." Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. at 1575. Any deviation from this rule would require the creation of a new rule of law in violation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Petitioner cannot obtain an evidentiary hearing on this claim and the claim should be denied on its merits.

his skeletal motion for an evidentiary hearing petitioner points to a handful of documents that -- he says -entitle him to an evidentiary hearing. He gives no explanation for the relevancy or importance of any of these documents, and indeed makes no specific reference to their individual relevance. Apparently petitioner (through his counsel) would prefer to have respondent's counsel or the court do the work of actually analyzing the claims. But petitioner's utter failure to present any kind of coherent argument as to specifically why he is entitled to a hearing renders these claims conclusory and wholly devoid of specifics, such that an evidentiary hearing is not Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d at 679. Indeed, as necessary. respondent will show, the items identified by petitioner do not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.

Exhibit 1 consist of the transcript of an interview of Bruce Samuelson. The interview was conducted on August 4, 1993 by the California Attorney General's Office. During the interview, Samuelson states he has not reviewed any materials or documents regarding the case in the last decade. Samuelson says he "went into the hole" because he has a temper and wanted to avoid fighting, and he could protect his belongings -- including his court papers -- if he was removed from the general population. Ex. 1 at 9-12.

Samuelson was aware of claims that he had been planted to obtain incriminating evidence from petitioner. Those claims were untrue. Ex. 1 at 13. Samuelson did not even know who petitioner was until asked about petitioner by another inmate, possibly an inmate named "Stony." Ex. 1 at 13. This inmate asked whether petitioner was in "the hole." When Samuelson asked petitioner if he was Mike Morales, petitioner reacted in a hostile manner. Ex. 1 at 15.

Samuelson describes the configuration of this portion of the jail. Samuelson's cell was located diagonally in relation to petitioner's cell. Ex. 1 at 16-17.

Samuelson explained how he became acquainted with petitioner. Petitioner drew pictures and displayed them to other inmates. Samuelson admired these drawing and petitioner offered to draw something for Samuelson. Ex. 1 at 18.

Samuelson was busy at work on his own case when petitioner began questioning Samuelson about Samuelson's case. Ex. 1 at 19. Petitioner then asked Samuelson technical and supposedly

hypothetical questions such as, if a deceased was stabbed, whether bleeding would occur. Samuelson said he would ask a doctor friend. Ex. 1 at 20. Petitioner later returned to question Samuelson, when petitioner described the murder in detail. Ex. 1 at 50.

At this point Samuelson and petitioner began conversing in Spanish because petitioner feared other inmates would eavesdrop. Ex. 1 at 21. Both men were conversant in Spanish. Ex. 1 at 23. The two would also communicate with written notes. Ex. 1 at 25. They also wanted to talk at night to avoid other inmates. Ex. 1 at 25.

Petitioner asked Samuelson for help with petitioner's case. Samuelson agreed, knowing nothing about petitioner's case. Ex. 1 at 21.

As petitioner was describing the dead person and the stabbing, he added more details. Ex. 1 at 23.

Petitioner discussed his homosexual cousin, and claimed his cousin was doing time for the same crime as petitioner. Ex. 1 at 27.

Petitioner told Samuelson the background of the crime -that the victim was in a romantic triangle involving petitioner's
homosexual cousin and the cousin's bisexual boyfriend.
Petitioner's cousin believed the victim was the instigator. Ex.
1 at 29. Petitioner wanted to teach the victim a lesson about
"messing with family." Ex. 1 at 29-30.

Petitioner explained to Samuelson how the victim was lured away. Ex. 1 at 30.

Petitioner and Samuelson discussed whether the crime involved kidnapping because the victim had voluntarily gotten into the vehicle. Samuelson said it was a "gray area." Ex. 1 at 32.

Petitioner explained various factual details leading up to the abduction. Ex. 1 at 33-35.

Samuelson questioned petitioner as to why they would have gone to Lodi and Woodbridge from Stockton. Ex. 1 at 35-36.

Petitioner described the ruse that was used to explain petitioner's presence in the car. Ex. 1 at 39-40.

Petitioner explained that the murder was planned to take place within a particular time frame. Ex. 1 at 41.

Petitioner described the instruments he had with him: a "vato" belt, a hammer and a knife. Ex. 1 at 42. Petitioner told Samuelson he needed the knife and hammer "for punishment." Ex. 1 at 42.

Around this time petitioner asked Samuelson to serve as petitioner's co-counsel. Ex. 1 at 42. Samuelson declined, but said he would assist petitioner in preparation for trial. Ex. 1 at 43.

Samuelson got involved in petitioner's case. Ex. 1 at 43. Samuelson wanted to know whether petitioner was disputing guilt as a factual matter or instead intended a technical defense. Petitioner claimed he "needed to fight technicalities." Ex. 1 at 43-44.

Samuelson had by now decided to tell someone in authority. Samuelson was not seeking to benefit personally, but was

concerned there would otherwise be insufficient circumstantial evidence to convict petitioner. Ex. 1 at 45.

Petitioner and Samuelson again discussed the facts, including the weapons. Petitioner showed Samuelson a polaroid photograph of petitioner holding the belt. When Samuelson asked about the significance of the belt, petitioner said he had attempted to strangle the victim with the belt. Ex. 1 at 45-46.

As petitioner described the drive to Lodi, Samuelson asked for greater detail. Petitioner described Rocky giving him predetermined signal that the crime could take place undetected. Ex. 1 at 46.

Petitioner removed the belt, the hammer and knife that were conceded under his shirt. Ex. 1 at 46.

Petitioner described in great detail how he killed the victim. Ex. 1 at 47-49. Petitioner described why he used the hammer rather than his fists -- it was "more fulfilling" and he would avoid sustaining any bruises. Ex. 1 at 47.

Petitioner as Samuelson whether he would be guilty of rape if he sexually assaulted the victim while she was unconscious. Ex. 1 at 49.

Samuelson was interested in obtaining information about the case. Ex. 1 at 51.

Petitioner boasted that he would get away with the crime, just as he had killed in the past and gotten away with it. Ex. 1 at 52.

Petitioner and Samuelson simulated asking trial-like questions and answers. Petitioner was confident his cousin would

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never testify against petitioner. Ex. 1 at 53. As part of this mock trial, petitioner and Samuelson removed all the likely witnesses who would testify against petitioner. Ex. 1 at 55.

They discussed petitioner's contradiction statements about the location of the knife and the hammer. Ex. 1 at 56.

Petitioner and Samuelson discussed implicably petitioner's version as the killer in the event his cousin elected to testify against petitioner. Ex. 1 at 61.

Petitioner reiterated his request that Samuelson help him in court. Ex. 1 at 61-62.

Petitioner reiterated his intent in protecting his cousin as the motive for the murder. Ex. 1 at 62-63.

Petitioner predicted to Samuelson he will succeed in having the trial venue changed because the case had been published in newspapers. Samuelson reiterated that he was unfamiliar with any publicity about the case. Ex. 1 at 64-65.

The two discussed the ethnic profile in jury profiles in potential trial locations. Ex. 1 at 65.

Petitioner showed Samuelson where he has hidden a shank within his cell. Samuelson now ears retaliation by petitioner if Samuelson becomes an informant. Ex. 1 at 67. Samuelson subsequently told jail officials about the hidden shank. Samuelson was then moved to a different jail. Ex. 1 at 68-69.

The more Samuelson talked to petitioner, the more Samuelson realized he has a crucial witness -- especially since he did not expect petitioner's cousin to incriminate petitioner. Ex. 1 at 70

Petitioner and Samuelson discussed the applicability of a robbery-murder in light of petitioner's theft of the victim's jewelry. Ex. 1 at 74.

Samuelson described the term of his arrangement with the district attorney's office. Ex. 1 at 87. He said there "was not that much of a plea bargain," and described the agreement as insubstantial. He was declined witness protection. Samuelson thought he had gotten a bad deal. Ex. 1 at 87.

In short, Exhibit 1 offers no support for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner also claims Exhibit 4 entitles him to an evidentiary hearing. Mot. at 7. His reference to Exhibit 4 is puzzling. Exhibit 4 is a summary of the results of the district attorney's polygraph examination of Samuelson. According to the district attorney's polygraph examiner, Samuelson

was being truthful; that he did obtain the information that he gave in a supplement to the Stockton Police Department from Morales himself and he did not get it from any other source.

Thus, Exhibit 4, squarely confirming that Samuelson's account was truthful, and offers no support for petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.

Exhibit 5 is merely a copy of the questions asked of petitioner during the polygraph examination, and the raw chart of petitioner's examination. Exhibit 5 thus offers no support for petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing.

In 1994 petitioner retained an expert to analyze the district attorney's polygraph examination. Exhibit 6 is the report of petitioner's expert, who determined that "it cannot be concluded Samuelson was truthful" when he answered one of the questions put to him. Ex. at 3.

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The foregoing demonstrates that petitioner cannot offer this court any significant evidence impeaching Samuelson or undermining his trial testimony. On the contrary, petitioner points to things that only confirm the truthfulness of Samuelson's trial testimony, such as his recent interview by respondent. And petitioner's discussion of polygraph evidence is fundamentally misplaced here because the United States Supreme Court has squarely held that there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. United States v. Scheffer, U.S. ____, [1996 WL 141151, March 31, 1998]. Ironically, however, in this case a polygraph examination of Samuelson only reinforces his credibility. And Exhibit 6, the opinion of petitioner's polygraph examiner, does not even consist of an examination of petitioner with an accompanying conclusion that petitioner is answering untruthfully. Ιt is merely the second-hand interpretation by petitioner's expert of the test conducted by the district attorney. And even petitioner's expert will only say that, as to one of petitioner's responses, "it cannot be concluded Samuelson was truthful." Ex. 6 petitioner's expert does not even the truthfulness of a variety of petitioner's answers during the polygraph examination,

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including Samuelson's answer that petitioner had confessed to him (question 39 of the examination).

E. Claim 5. Knowing Use Of Perjured Testimony (Samuelson)

In petitioner's fifth claim for relief (pet. at 44-55), he alleges that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony by witness Bruce Samuelson, thereby denying petitioner his rights in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In particular support of this legal claim, petitioner alleges that "it is entirely probable that the facts testified to by Samuelson were provided to him by the District Attorney" (pet. at 47:23-24), because at petitioner's trial Bruce testified that petitioner's "confession began on November 15, (Pet. at 45:25-26.) Petitioner alleges that, contradiction of this testimony, Deputy District Attorney Bernard Garber made an undated handwritten entry in Samuelson's case file on an district attorney "evaluation" form that "had to have been made on or before November 15, 1982" that stated: "PX waived - D to plead to Count 1 + 1 count of 470 for local. See BG re details (D is to testify in Peo v. Morales - 187 w/ specials, D to remain in custody) BG." (Pet. at 46:9-17.) This undated entry had to have been made on or before November 15, petitioner alleges, because at the bottom of this evaluation form there appears "a stamp which reads: 'Receipt of a copy of this document is hereby acknowledged: 'followed by the handwritten entry: 'to D' and signed 'BG 11/15,'" (pet. at 46:20-23), "or else the District Attorney simply provided Samuelson with a copy of the blank form,